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vidual of a set of circumstances such as those which caused 
defendant to kill appears remote. 
Not only do we mention the foregoing factors as reasonable 
explanation of the selection of the extreme penalty by the 
jury here; also we mention the various generally accepted 
purposes of punishment as matters of which the jury might 
appropriately be advised in connection with their selection 
of penalty for first degree murder. 
While at least some of us may doubt that this defendant 
exemplifies the type of criminal who should be put to death 
for his crimes, we find in the record no legal basis for con-
cluding that the proceedings in the trial court were invalid or 
that there was prejudicial error which caused a miscarriage 
of justice. 
For the reasons above stated, the judgment and order deny-
ing a new trial are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., and McComb, J., con-
curred. 
Spence, J., concurred in the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied February 
27, 1957. 
[L.A. No. 24232. In Bank. Jan. 30, 1957.] 
AU'rO:M:OTRIZ DEL GOLFO DE CAijiFORNIA S. A. de 
C. V., Respoude11t, v. ERWIN G. RESNICK et al., Ap-
pellants. 
[1] Corporations- Foreign Corporations- Actions- Burden of 
Proof.-The burden of proving that Corp. Code, § 6801, pre-
cludes maintenance of an action by a foreign corporation is 
on the party pleading the bar of the statute. 
[2] !d.-Foreign Corporations-Actions-Burden of Proof.-De-
fendants, sued for the price of automobiles sold them by a 
foreign corporation, in order to prove that Corp. Code, § 6801 
applies, must show that the particular transaction was an 
·intrastate sale. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Corporations, § 902; [4] Corpora-
tions,§ 5; [5] Corporations,§ 6; [6, 8] Corporations,§ 8; [7] Cor-
porations, § 5. 
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[3] !d.-Foreign Corporations-Actions-Evidence.--In an action 
a for the balance due on the price of 
automobiles sold to the trial court was justified 
in concluding that defendants to meet the burden of 
showing that the sale was an intrastate transaction where there 
was evidence with reference to similar transactions, 
the cars would be sent to Los and the buyer would pay 
the cost of them from where plaintiff 
sometimes cars to the "L.A. automobile auction" and 
occasionally, not sold there, its agent would offer them to 
defendant, usually negotiating telephone from Mexico, and 
where plaintiff's sales representative testified that "it could 
be possible" that the cars in question were up" at such 
auction. 
[ 4] !d.-Disregard of Corporate Entity.-The conditions under 
which a corporate may be disregarded vary according 
to the circumstances in Pach case. 
[5] !d.-Disregard of Corporate Entity.-A corporate entity may 
be disregarded where there is such unity of interest and owner-
ship that the separate personalities of the corporation and the 
individuals no longer exist, and where, if the acts are treated 
as those of the corporation alone, an inequitable result will 
follow. 
[6] !d.-Disregard of Corporate Entity-Evidence.--Failure to 
issue stock or to apply at any time for a permit, although not 
conclusive evidence, is an indication that defendants were 
doing business as individuals. 
[7] !d.-Disregard of Corporate Entity.-Inadequate capitalization 
may be considered as a factor in determining whether the cor-
porate entity should be disregarded. 
[8] !d.-Disregard of Corporate Entity-Evidence.-In determin-
ing whether defendants should be allowed to escape personal 
liability for the debts due plaintiff, the trinl court was entitled 
to consider the failure to issue any stock or apply for per-
mission to do so and the creation aud operation of a corpora-
tion with little or no capital, as well as all relevant facts con-
cerning the manner in which the business was operated. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ijos 
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Affirmed . 
.Action by foreign corporation 
automobiles sold to defendants. 
firmed. 
for balanec dnc on price of 
,J for plaintiff af-
[ 4] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Corporations, § 8; Am.Jur., Corporations, 
§§ 7, 8. 
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Bernard & Jaffe and George W. Rochester for Ap-
pellants. 
C. P. Von Herzen and Samuel L. Laidig as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Appellants. 
Francis B. Cobb for Respondent. 
GIBSON, C. a Mexican corporation, brought 
this action for the balance due on the price of eight automobiles 
which it alleges were sold to defendants E. G. Resnick, W. D. 
Cowan and R. vV. Cowan. The trial court found for plaintiff, 
and defendants have appealed from the judgment. 
Defendants contend first that plaintiff cannot maintain this 
action bee,ause, they assert, the transaction was intrastate 
and plaintiff did not allege or prove that it had qualified to 
do business in California by complying with chapter 3 of the 
Corporations Code. Section 6801 of the Corporations Code 
provides in part: "A foreign corporation subject to the 
provisions of Chapter 3 of this part which transacts intrastate 
business in this State without complying therewith shall not 
maintain any action or proceeding upon any intrastate busi-
ness so transacted in any court of this State, commenced prior 
to compliance with Chapter 3 until it has complied with 
the provisions thereof, . . . '' 
[1] 'rhe burden of proving that section 6801 precludes 
maintenance of an action is upon the party pleading the bar 
of the statute. (W. W. Kimball Co. v. Read, 43 Cal.App. 
342, 346 [185 P. 192] ; see McMillan Process Co. v. Brown, 
33 Cal.App.2d 279, 284 [91 P.2d 613] ; Indian Refining Co., 
Inc. v. Royal Oil Co., Inc., 102 Cal.App. 710, 716 [283 P. 856] .) 
[2] Defendants, in order to prove that the statute applies, 
were required to show that the particular transaction involved 
here was an intrastate sale. [3] There is evidence that, 
prior to the sale of the eight automobiles, several similar 
transactions had been arranged by telephone between plaintiff 
in Mexico and Resnick in Los Angeles. After agreement 
on the price, the cars would be sent to I,os Angeles, and the 
buyer would pay the cost of transporting them from Mexico. 
Sales made in that manner were not intrastate transactions. 
Plaintiff sometimes shipped ears to the "h A. automobile 
auction,'' Oil oeeasion, if they were not sold there, its 
agent would offer them to Resnick, usually negotiating by 
telephone from Mexico. The only evidence as to how the 
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be pos::;ible'' 
automobile anetion. ' 
court was in 
failed to meet the burden of 
here was all intrasl ate transad ion. 
was 
alive that" it eonld 
up" at the "h A. 
of the re<~ord the trial 
that defendants had 
that the sale involved 
Defendants next (·ontend that the evidenee is insuffieient 
to support the trial court's finding that they were doing busi-
ness as individuals. \Y e do not agree. 
In September of 1932 llesnick and several other persons 
formed Erbel, Inc., a Califomia corporation. After obtaining 
releases from his associates of their interest in the corporation, 
Hesnick arranged with IN. D. Cowan and his son, R. \V. Cowan, 
to establish a car company. It was orally agreed that Resniek, 
who was to manage the business, was to receive 50 per cent of 
the "profits" and that each of the Cowans was to receive 
25 per cent, and the three of them berame offieers and directors 
of Erbel, Inc. 'rhe corporation mwer issued stock or applied 
for a permit to issue stork, am1, although clef'endants testified 
that they contributed $5,000 to the capital of Erbcl, Inc., the 
court did not find that this was trne, and such a finding was 
not compelled by the reeorcl. 'rhere is no evidence that any 
bank aceount was ever maintained in the name of Erbel, Inc., 
but a checking aeeount was opened by defendants with the 
Bank of America under the name "Erhel, Ine. dba Bi-Rite 
Auto Sales." 
The volume of sales from the automobile business eonducted 
by defendants ran between $100,000 and $150,000 a month. 
'l'he method used to finanee the purehase of cars which were 
to be offered for sale ·was complex, but it is clear that the 
funds required for this purpose ·were supplied by the Cowans 
and not by the corporation. According to defendants, they 
bought ears for resale with money furnished by the Cowans, 
and title was held by the Cowans until a purchaser for a car 
>vas found. The proeeeds of resale were apparently deposited 
in the Bank of Ameriea aecount, and checks were drawn on 
that aeeount by Resnick to reimburse the Cowans for the 
money advanced. In this connection, the trial court found 
that the Cowans made advances in the amount of $223,445 
which were used by defendants to operate the business and 
which were repaid in part from time to time. 
Erbel, Inc. filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, listing 
liabilities of $146,247.43 and assets whieh were subsequently 
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$16,000. 
before initiation of the 
apparent that the business 
Cowans transferred to 
they were then uvL.uH.t>; 
and a half 
proceedings, when it was 
was in financial difficulties, the 
the automobile titles which 
Prior to transactions with defendants, 
plaintiff informed Hesnick that would not accept his check 
or draft, and it deal \vith him only after it was 
assured that W. D. Cowan was "going into business" and 
would be ''backing the business up.'' In previous transactions 
plaintiff had been given checks drawn on the Bank of America 
account, and the present action is based upon two checks which 
were drawn by Hesnick on that account and later dishonored 
by the bank. 
[ 4] It is the general rule that the conditions under which 
a corporate entity may be disregarded vary according to the 
circumstances in each case. (See II. A. S. Loan Service, Inc. v. 
McColgan, 21 Cal.2d 518, 523 [138 P.2d 391, 145 .A.L.R. 349]; 
Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal.2d 839, 846 [129 P.2d 390].) [5] It 
has been stated that the tvvo requirements for application 
of this doctrine are (1) that there be such unity of interest 
and ownership that the separate personalities of the corpo-
ration and the individual no longer exist and (2) that, if the 
acts are treated as those of the corporation alone, an inequi-
table result will follow. (Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal.2d 839, 846 
[129 P.2d 390]; Watson v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 8 Cal.2d 
61, 68 [63 P.2d 295] .) 
[6] The failure to issue stock or to apply at any time for 
a permit, although not conclusive evidence, is an indication 
that defendants were doing business as individuals. (Geisen-
hoff v. Mabrey, 58 CaLI\.pp.2d 481 [137 P.2d 36]; see Marr v. 
Postal Union Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal..App.2d 673 [105 P.2d 649).) 
In the Marr case the court stated: ""While the fact standing 
alone that a corporation remains inchoate without stockholders 
or stock is not of itself determinative of an alter ego relation-
ship upon its part, nevertheless it does indicate that such 
corporation may exist merely to serve the interests of another 
-a corporation or an individual.'' ( 40 Cal . .App.2d at p. 
682.) 
[7] .Another factor to be considered in determining 
whether individuals dealing through a corporation should be 
held personally responsible for the corporate obligations is 
whether there was an attempt to provide adequate capitaliza-
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tion for the In Ballantine on Corporations (rev. 
ed., 1946), at pages it is stated: ''If a corporation 
is organized and carries on business without substantial capital 
in such a way that the corporation is likely to have no suffi-
cient assets available to meet its debts, it is inequitable that 
shareholders should set up such a organization to escape 
personal liability. The attempt to do corporate business 
without providing any sufiicient basis of financial responsi-
bility to creditors is an abuse of the and will 
be ineffectual to the shareholders from corporate debts. 
It is coming to be as the policy of the law that 
shareholders should in good faith put at the risk of the 
business unincumbered capital reasonably adequate for its 
prospective liabilities. If the capital is illusory or trifling com-
pared with the business to be done and the risks of loss, this 
is a ground for denying the separate entity privilege.'' 
The rule that inadequate capitalization may be considered 
as a factor in determining whether the corporate entity should 
be disregarded was followed in Shea v. Lconis, 14 Cal.2d 666 
[96 P.2d 332], where a lessee attempted to escape liability 
for rent due under a lease by assigning his interest in the 
lease to a corporation which was without other assets. The 
court held that the owners of the corporate stock were liable 
for the rental payments, pointing out that it is proper to 
disregard corporate existence "where, as in the instant case, 
the device adopted is ... an attempt to avoid liability for 
benefits enjoyed by means of taking the obligation in the name 
of a specially organized corporation which has no assets." 
In CaTlesimo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal.App.2d 482 [197 P.2d 167], 
it was recognized that "the proper rule is that inadequate 
financing, where such appears, is a factor, and an important 
factor, in determining whether to remove the insulation to 
stockholders normally created by the corporate method of 
operation." (See also Moshc1· v. Salt River Valley WateT 
Users' Assn., 39 Ariz. 567 [8 P.2d 1077]; Ballantine, CoTpo-
rations: "Disreoanling the Corpomte E11tity" as a Regttla-
tm·y P1·ocess (J 943) 31 Cal.L.Rev. 426, 427; Fuller, The 
Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company 
(1938) 51 Harv.hHev. 1373, 1381-1383; cf. Dixie Coal Min. 
& Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 221 A.la. 331 [128 So. 799] .) Al-
though defelHlallis l('siified that the sum of $0,000 beeame a 
part of the eapita1 of the corporatim1, the trial court, as 
we have seen, was llot compelled to aeeept that testimony 
as being true. Moreover, even if the court believed defend-
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ants' in this regard, it could have inferred that 
$5,000 was an insufficient capital investment in view of the 
volume of business conducted. 
[8] In determining whether defendants should be allowed 
to escape personal liability for the debts due plaintiff, the 
trial court was entitled to consider the failure to issue any 
stoek or for to do so and the ereation and 
operation of Erbel, with little or no capital, as well as 
all relevant facts concerning the manner in which the business 
was operated. 
There is ample support in the record for the finding of the 
trial court that defendants were doing business as individuals. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Traynor, ,J., Schauer, ,J., Spence, .T., and Mc-
Comb, eoncurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
As I read the majority opinion, it holds that the corporate 
entity may be disregarded where the corporation has not 
issued any stoek and is undercapitalized. 
As to the first point, it is difficult to see how there can be 
a liability imposed upon the stockholders for an obligation 
of the corporation when there are no stockholders to hold 
liable. The theory of piercing the corporate veil is based on 
the concept that the shareholders of the corporation are liable 
although the obligation was ostensibly incurred by the corpo-
ration because on one basis or another the shareholders and 
corporation will not be distinguished; the separation of the 
corporate entity from its stockholders will not be observed. 
This is to be distinguished from the case such as may exist 
here where the individuals interested in the corporation are, 
rather than the corporation, the ones who incurred the obliga-
tion or the obligation was incurred by both. In the instant 
case it is true that no stock was issued nor was a permit for 
issuance obtained from the Corporation Commissioner, yet the 
evidence is undisputed that it was agreed that defendant 
Resnick would own half the corporation and the Cowans the 
other half and the business was just getting started. With 
such facts present it is difficult to sec why the mere failure 
to issue stock could be a fa(,tor in determining whether the 
corporate entity should be disregard(•(1. Tn GeisenJwff v. 
Mabrey, 58 CaJ.App.2d 481 [J 37 P.2d 36], relied upon by the 
majority, the trial court had found that the persons who 
Jan. AuTOMO'TRIZ ETC. DE CALIFORNIA v. RESNICK 799 
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formed the venturers 
and as sueh incurred the the name of the eorpo-
ration. That ease seems to hold that individual may 
not be escaped by the formation of a corporation unless and 
until stock is issued. No authority is cited for that proposition 
and I find none which supports it. It would indeed be a novel 
theory in eorporation law. As said on the subject by the 
District Court of Appeal in this ease: "\Vhile the Corpora-
tions Code authorizes corporate directors to organize by the 
election of officers, yet, they may in the name of and in behalf 
of the corporation apply for a permit to issue its shares. 
Corporation Code, sections 25154, 25153. However, these 
sections do not prohibit the transaction of corporate business 
or the performance of any act by the corporation other than 
the issue or sale of securities. Prior to the enactment of the 
last cited sections, the courts had held that a partnership is not 
necessarily the result of an abortive attempt to organize a 
corporation or of a mere failure to issue corporate shares. 
Blanchard v. Kanll, 44 Cal. 440, 451; 1. W. Williams Co. v. 
Leong Stte Ah Qnin, 44 Cal.App. 296, 298 [186 P. 401]. The 
idea that the organizers of a corporation vi·ould be penalized 
in any way for the transaction of corporate business prior to 
the issuance of its stock does not appear to have occurred to 
the authors of section 25154. The only penalties to accrue 
against directors with reference to the issuance of shares are 
those which result from the enforcement of the statutes for 
violations of the Corporate Securities Aet. Corporation Code, 
section 25000 et seq. It makes felonious many aets of corpo-
rate officers in attempting to issue their company's securities 
without first having obtained a permit so to do. But nowhere 
is it there suggested that a eorporation is emasculated by 
virtue of its failure to procure a permit to issue its shares. 
Nor is there any authority for holding that the failure of 
directors to obtain a permit makes of them a copartnership 
or a joint adventure except the Geisenhoff decision, supra, 
which imposed a sanction without legislative authorization. 
On the contrary, the point was before this court in Vogel v. 
Banker·s Bldg. Corp., 112 Cal.App.2d 160, 168 [245 P.2d 
1069]. It was there held in effect that non-issuance of stock 
does not as a matter of law fasten upon promoters the status 
of joint adventurers; that the creation of that relationship 
depends upon the intent of the parties." (A1domotriz del 
Golfo de California v. Resnick (Cal.App.), 297 P.2d 109, 114.) 
The other factor relied upon by the majority is no more 
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is an indi-
eation that the should be disregarded. Pre-
cisely what is meant by undercapitalization is not explained. 
The mere structure of the capital stock is not important. For 
the idea to be it must refer to the assets of the 
financial standing. But the majority opinion 
mentions the " stock" authorization of $5,000 and 
compares that with a business of $100,000 to $150,000 per 
month. However, as stated in the majority opinion, the 
Cowans were money to operate the business and as 
far as appears that was advanced to the corporation as its 
asset. The monthly business was gross sales and thus there 
was sufficient income to handle the business; that monthly in-
come did not result in an expense or incurrence of obligations 
by the corporation. In fact, there is no evidence which reflects 
the financial status of the corporation other than its authorized 
capital stock which is no criterion of its financial health. 
Hence it follows that it was not shown that the assets were so 
inadequate that the corporate entity must be disregarded even 
if we assume that its financial worth is a factor in determining 
whether the entity is to be disregarded. Moreover, that as-
sumption is of very doubtful validity because otherwise only 
well financed corporations may maintain their entity. In 
fact it may be said that every corporation which fails because 
it is unable to pay its obligations is underfinanced, but cer-
tainly that should not be a test of whether the entity should 
be disregarded. In a rapidly changing economy what might 
seem to be adequate financing today would be inadequate 
tomorrow, and it should be obvious that risky business ventures 
could not be undertaken by use of the corporate device with-
out subjecting the participants to personal liability. I know 
of no such rule. What may appear hazardous by hindsight 
may not seem so at the outset. If the corporate entity may 
be disregarded in a case such as this it will not be safe for 
anyone to use the corporate device for the promotion of a 
business enterprise even though he acts in the utmost good 
faith and pursues a course of unquestionable fair dealing. 
In my opinion there is no factual basis here to justify 
piercing the corporate veil and disregarding the corporate 
entity. To justify such holding it should be made to appear 
that the corporate entity was employed as a mere shield for 
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created the showing 1s 
reasons, I would reverse the judgment. 
a \Yas dvni<'cl 
of the opinion that tlH' petition 
[L.A. No. 23838. In Bank. Feb. 1, 1957.] 
WILLIAM A. KEELE!\, .Appellant, v. IWTH SCHULTE 
et al., Respondents. 
[1] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation 
-Parties.-A corporation is an indispensable party to a 
representative action brought on its behalf; its rights, not 
those of the nominal plaintiff, are to be litigated, and the court 
has no jurisdiction to adjudicate its rights in its absence as a 
party. 
[2a, 2b] Appeal-Law of Case-Questions Concluded.-The pro-
priety of prosecuting an action involving the validity of a 
deed and transfers of property belonging to a lodge corporation 
of a theosophical society without including the lodge as a 
party was not adjudicated on a former appeal so as to 
preclude a determination of such issue on a subsequent appeal, 
where the former opinion did not discuss the lodge's pleaded 
status as a corporation, the continuance of its corporate exist-
ence and legal rights under California law despite any pur-
ported dissolution and surrender of its charter according to 
theosophical law, and its absence as a party to the action. 
[3] Corporations-Dissolution.-A California corporation can only 
be dissolved in the manner and under the conditions prescribed 
in Corp. Code, §§ 4600-4692, and the withdrawal of a corpora-
tion's charter under ecclesiastical rules of law and order will 
not work a corporate dissolution in disregard of such state 
law. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Corporations, § 222; Am.Jur., Corporations, 
§ 466. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Corporations, § 444 et seq.; Am.Jur., Corpora-
tions, § 1285 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Corporations,§ 363; [2] Appeal and 
Error,§ 1350; [3] Corporations,§ 821. 
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